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This paper discusses the volatile political scene of Palestine 
during the period of the 1940s. The role of Jewish politics and 
Jewish terrorism in the ŴÙWUTŸŠŴŠŨĚof the British from Palestine 
are discussed as are the methods employed by the leading dissident 
group, the Irgun Zvai Leumi. The interaction between the British 
and the Jews as well as interaction between various Jewish 
organizations is also addressed. In this very violent and complex 
time, there was an unlikely leader, who had a dream for the Jewish 
people and he pursued that dream. That man was Menachem Begin and 
his influence in the Irgun and in the politics of the times is also 
examined. 
-For two thousand years, the Jewish people have been spread out 
to the four corners of the w9r1d. They were a people without a 
homeland. A people whose land, whose birth right has been taken 
away. For most of those two thousand years the Jews accepted their 
position calmly and patiently waiting for the Lord God to restore 
Eretz Israel, the "Land of Israel" to them. Some felt that this 
would never occur unless Jews intervened and took hold of their 
destiny. One such individual was Theordore Herz1, an author and 
a Viennese Jew, who after seeing Jews persecuted in the pogroms in 
Russia and the travesty of the Dreyfus Affair, wrote "The Jewish 
state" in 1896. In this work, Herz1 argued that the Jews are one 
people and are thus entitled to a separate state (Gerner, 14). 
Herz1 attended the First Zionist Congress in 1897 and felt that the 
creation of the Congress was the first major step towards the 
creation of a Jewish state. The "movement .. gained momentum and 
under the prowess of Vladimir Jabotinsky, the British in 1917, 
established a homeland for the Jews in Palestine with the Balfour 
Declaration. There was a clause in the declaration that would 
hamper the creation of a Jewish state. That clause in the 
declaration stated that " nothing shall be done which may 
prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish 
communities in Palestine ..... The identical phrasing was used when 
the United Kingdom recei ved the Mandate. The language of the 
Balfour Declaration and the Mandate was very vague, it stated that 
"His majesty's government view with favour the establishment of a 
national homeland for the Jewish people " (Laquer, 18). This 
--
vagueness brought many questions by Jew and Arab alike. What was 
meant by a homeland and doesn't the very presence of Jews on 
formerly Arab lands prejudice the Arab's civil and religious rights 
(Gerner, 17). This vagueness was the very beginning of a very vague 
British Mandate. 
The inter-war period was a very volatile time for the 
Zionists. In Eretz Israel, there was a limiting of Jewish 
immigration and there were pogroms in the 20s in which hundreds of 
Jews were killed by mobbing Arabs. Many within the Zionist 
Organization felt that the British were giving too little 
protection to the Jews. As a result, a wave of militancy rose 
through the Zionist Organization causing a rift between the left 
and the right wing, known as the Revisionists. During this time, 
there were increasing numbers of Arab-Israeli clashes and it was 
during this time that several militant Revisionist organizations 
arose one of which being the Ir,gun Zvai Leumi. The Irgun Zvai Leumi 
or National Military Organization, was created by Jabotinsky who 
was unable to convince the Zionist leadership of the need for a 
Jewish army (Begin, 3). During the Arab revolts in the late 30s the 
Irgun felt that the only response to continued Arab violence was 
that of retaliation. As a result of the Arab violence, the Irgun 
began to gather arms, increase training and begin to take on some 
form of order. During this period, the British began to take action 
against the Irgun and the Irgun fought back. This action was viewed 
as the threat to the good of the Jewish whole and the Zionist Left 
began to look with disfavor upon Jabotinsky and the Irgun (Bell, 
--
44) • 
The situation worsened when the deteriorating situation in 
Germany and Eastern Europe led to an increased influx of Jews to 
Eretz Israel. This increasing number of Jews angered the Arabs and 
it led to further violence. The British attempted to study how 
peace cab come in the region and thus created the Peel Commission. 
The Peel Commission recommendation to partition the Mandate only 
worsened the situation and led to increased Arab violence. To 
attempt to curb the new violence, the MacDonald White Paper was 
drafted that concluded that the partition of Palestine was 
unworkable and that their would be a limit on Jewish immigration to 
75,000 for five years (Gerner, 40). This in turn infuriated the 
Revisionist who see the immigration of other Jews into Israel as 
the only means of Jewish survival. The news of the 1938 White Paper 
caused anti-British sentiment among the Jews to increase and with 
that, bombings and shootings of British soldiers and police were 
almost commonplace. 
With the outbreak of World War II, there was a dramatic change 
in the Irqun's policy against the British. Jobotinsky felt that it 
would be mad to attack Hitler's most capable enemy (Bell, 51). The 
quick early German victories in Eastern Europe cost the Irgun very 
much. Located in Poland was the Irqun branch in the Diaspora known 
as the Betar. with the loss of the Polish Betarim, the Irqun lost 
the support and funds from the most enthusiastic and mil i tant 
segment of the Diaspora. These losses included the jailing of 
several of the Betar's best commanders including the Menachem 
--
Begin. Then another calamity befell the Irqun, Jabotinsky died. The 
. 
Irqun seemed to have " •.. no mission in Palestine, the Irqun had no 
apparent purpose" (Bell, 53). 
with seemingly no direction, some members of the Irqun joined 
the British Army to fight the apparently victorious Axis, but many 
more stayed in Eretz Israel to work on a very crucial matter, the 
immigration to Palestine of European Jewry. Jews attempted to enter 
Palestine aboard unsafe, unkept vessels aided by agents of the 
Zionist Organization. All risked their lives attempting the voyage 
but only a few managed to succeed in the quest. Many more like the 
individuals aboard the Atlantic were deported to other nations such 
as Mauritius or Cyprus. These i?dividuals,according to the words of 
Lord High Commissioner MacMichael, "would never be permitted to 
return (Bell, 53). 
After the death of Jobotinsky, the Irqun was under the 
leadership of Yaacov Meridor. Meridor did not take an aggressive 
position, he felt his was a caretaking responsibility. with the 
death of Jobi tinsky , there was constant changing of the High 
Command of the Irqun, There were many difficulties. "There were 
sporadic distribution of pamphlets and boardsheets, and an 
occasional sporadic clandestine radio broadcast. Some arms were 
lifted from the British, but little could be hidden" (Bell, 56). 
At the beginning of 1943·, Meridor felt that it was time for 
action. However the prospect for a revolt seemed dim. The strength 
of the Irqun was eroded, there was few arms, few safe houses, 
little equipment and even less money. Meridor decided to try one 
-spectacular operation. He intended to kidnap the High Commissioner 
of the Mandate, the senior British official in the area. He felt 
this would not harm the war effort yet, it would punish the British 
for the closing of the gates of Eretz Israel. The news of the 
treatment of the European Jewry was fortifying the will of the 
Irgun to open the gates of Palestine. Macmichael would be kidnapped 
and be "deported" to cyprus. The aim was to humiliate the British 
and to shed light and bring to the world's attention the cruelty of 
the closed gates. However, the plan like so many other Irgun plans 
and expectations faded. Bell stated that, " He [Meridor] approached 
Menachem Begin and suggested that he had done all he could and that 
the Irgun needed a new commander ••• a new direction and a new man 
were needed." 
Menachem Begin did not appear like your stereotypical 
underground leader. He was not a gunman, he was not a hardened 
fugitive he was not physically large and was described in the 
British Jewish Terrorist Index as having .. a long hooked nose, bad 
teeth, and large horned spectacles." Bell described him as," far 
from handsome, slender, immaculately dressed, with impeccable 
manners .•. he resembled a small town lawyer." He was a great orator 
and a logical man. His contacts were limited to his wife and a few 
members of the high command of the Irgun, but his influence spread 
throughout the organization. 
Begin's Irgun had much to be desired. The membership was 
eroded by years of inactivity. Many left and joined the British to 
fight the Nazis. Even with WUŸĚ rumors of action when Begin took 
,-
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over in December of 1943 , there were only six hundred activists 
left. The stores of arms and explosives were gone - lost, stolen or 
forgotten- leaving a grand total of four sub machine guns, thirty 
rifles, and sixty pistols, and less than a ton of explosives, no 
decent printing materials, no radio, no communications, and no 
money (Bell, 107). The Irgun didn't have the primary ingredients 
for revolt, what they did have was a core of dedicated and 
competent men. 
In January 1944, members were getting tired of inactivity and 
decided to carry out an Irgun attack and mine some government cars. 
The police arrived and captured one of the men and sentenced him to 
ten years. Begin could sense the urgency for action and thus, he 
decided the time was right to issue "The Proclamation of Revolt." 
The Proclamation stated the political demands of the Jewish people. 
The proclamation stated: 
"There is no longer any armistice between the Jewish people 
and the British Administration in Eretz Israel which hands our 
brothers over to Hitler. Our people is at a state of war with this 
regime - war to the end. 
"This war will demand many and heavy sacrifices, but we enter 
on it in the consciousness that we are being faithful to the 
children of our people who have been and are being slaughtered. It 
is for their sake that we fight, to their dying testimony that we 
remain loyal." 
" This is our demand: Immediate transfer of power in Eretz 
Israel to a Provisional Hebrew Government. 
-II We shall fight, every Jew in the Homeland will fight. The 
God of Israel, the Lord of Hosts, will aid us. There will be no 
retreat. Freedom - or death. 
"Build a protecting wall around your fighting youth. Do no 
forsake them ••• " 
" The fighting youth will not flinch from tribulation and 
sacrifice, from blood and suffering. They will not surrender until 
they have renewed our days of old, until they have ensured for our 
people a Homeland, freedom, honour, bread and justice. And if you 
will give them your aid you will see in our days the Return to Zion 
and the Restoration of Israel" (Begin, 243). 
The Proclamation's messa"ge was clear, it was intended to 
declare the Irgun's goal which Begin labeled as the goal of the 
Jewish people. It was also declared to garner support of the 
Yishuv ,or the Jewish people in Eretz Israel. For without the 
support of the people, it would be next to impossible to organize 
and carry out underground actions. Begin wanted the people to know 
that there would be sacrifices made not only by the Irgun, but by 
the Yishuv as well. This was to be expected. Some sacrifice was to 
be made, however the reward for the sacrifice, the creation of a 
Jewish state was well worthy of their sacrifice. 
The reaction of the British was the same as the reaction of 
" 
most of the masses. A leading anti-underground constable J. T . 
wilken announced to his employers , "There's nothing to worry 
about" (Begin, 45). Initially he seemed correct. The Irgun began 
with small scale bombings. They bombed the Immigration Departments 
-in Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem. The bombings increased in 
intensity and by the end of the year, the arrogant constable Wilken 
was killed by the underground. 
The struggle was not all military in nature, to a large 
extent the struggle depended on political pressure as well. As the 
struggle moved forward, the Irgun developed strategies in this area 
based on: a comprehensive study of the methods used by oppressor 
administrations in foreign countries, on an objective study of the 
international situation, and the examination of the position and 
the condition of Great Britain at the end of World War II (Bell, 
72). 
The British have vast experience in ruling over foreign and 
often times backward people. After study, the Irgun found out that 
the British avoid making their rule dependent on force, but rather 
on the power of prestige. When British administrators are faced 
with violent opposition they tend to find a way out by foregoing 
direct British rule with indirect British rule "History and our 
observation have persuaded us that if we could succeed in 
destroying the government's prestige in Eretz Israel, the removal 
of its rule would follow automatically •••• We[Irgun] hit at the 
British Governments prestige, deliberately, tirelessly, 
unceasingly" (Begin, 52). 
During the struggle all attacks were a success even if they 
were a failure. The Irgun learned from their failure and even if 
the attacks were not a military success, they were a political 
. 
success because of the damage that the battles inflicted on the 
-prestige of the British. The Irqun gained something valuable as 
well from the losses. The Irqun always told the truth after an 
attack (Bell, 120). This policy of honesty, no matter how bad the 
news built a feeling of trust among the Yishuv that helped the 
image of the Irqun as honorable freedom fighters immensely. 
The struggle of the Irqun was the most publicized partisan 
struggle in the world (Begin, 56). The reports screamed across the 
world headlines whether the bait1es were successful or not. Each of 
them brought the struggle into the public eye, especially the eye 
of the United states. The increase of media attention also 
increased the protection for the Yishuv for the British wouldn't 
risk the condemnation of the world community and especially the 
united states for killing members of an ethnic group that has just 
been victims of a genocide. 
After the Second World War, there was an upheaval in the 
world's political picture. World powers became weak, armies and 
navies were dispersed, and the world came to be dominated by two 
huge superpowers. In this picture Britain fell in the awkward 
position of being situated very close to the enemy in the east and 
also facing a huge deficit in the budget to which the Mandate was 
only adding to. The British could not maintain or afford to secure 
the Mandate. After the exhausting war, Britain was low on resources 
and when the attacks began, it seemed more and more in Britain's 
self-interest to withdraw. 
The Irqun did not carry out operations against individuals 
except in rare cases (Begin, 95). The battle tactics were based on 
-the idea of maximum exploitation of surprise and the employment of 
small forces for a big effect. The Attack Force of the Irgun 
typically blasted a path with explosives, and blew up their 
obj ecti ve while being covered by machine gun cover. The Attack 
Force (A.F.) attacked every day of the week except for the Sabbath 
(Begin, 52). It was for this reason that the "nervous" British 
troops looked forward to the Sabbath rather than Sunday. Begin 
stated, "We too were believers. We believed in the Almighty, we 
believed in our mission and in the justice of our cause. And though 
we knew that our struggle was obligatory and so permissible on the 
Sabbath, we generally gave our. arms respite on that day." 
The informing and the support of the Yishuv was very important 
to the struggle. The Irgun distributed an unending stream of Irgun 
proclamations, posters, and position papers as to inform the Jews 
what the revolt was, why it was taken, and what its results would 
be. Begin communicated with his people and with the entire mandate 
from the pages of the Herut. He himself produced this one man 
newspaper (Bell, 118). Even more effective was the clandestine 
radio. The Irgun broadcasted from different positions for six 
minutes at a time to avoid British monitoring and location. 
The Irgun and the other major separatist group the LEHI or 
Stern Gang were going against the consensus of the Haganah or the 
Zionist left. The Haganah felt that the creation of the state would 
come about through negotiation and through peaceful methods. They 
felt that violence against the British would only delay the leaving 
of the British and would only anger them further, thus injuring the 
.-
Yishuv. The Haganah felt that the actions of the separatist had 
gone far enough and in November 1943, during the sixth Histadrut 
convention, approved by the Haganah leadership and supported by 
David Ben Gurion, activated the four part motion: expulsion of 
members of the separatist groups from employment, denial to them of 
shelter and refuge, no submission to threats and extortion, and 
most importantly cooperation with the British to wipe out the 
terror (Bell, 127). Some extreme leftist such as Pinchas Lubianiker 
felt, "By fair means or foul we must fight this thing[Irgun] as one 
united body" (Pedazur, 3).M The Zionist Jewish Agency, the 
"official" Jewish governing body, was anything but united. Some 
opposed the persecution of the Irgun, some opposed the cooperation 
wi th the British, but many went along with Ben Gurion and the 
majority in the persecution of the Irgun who were not just a 
terrorist organization but the political opponents of Ben Gurion 
and his majority as well (Bell, 127). 
During the action against the Irgun , which was referred to as 
The Season, one thousand Irgun suspects were handed over to the 
British. The Haganah was also interrogating the suspects often 
times, torturing them. Many lost their homes, their jobs and their 
freedom. The Haganah commander Eliyahu Golomb stated that liThe 
organized Yishuv has brought terrorist activity to a standstill" 
(Pedazur, 25). Golomb was very much correct. However the Haganah 
did not understand why the Irgun was not retaliating for the 
kidnapings, the beatings, and.the torture. The Season created an 
absolute crisis in the Irgun. The British were getting lists of 
--
hundreds of suspects per day.The British broke into arms dumps, 
broke into safe houses. The situation was looking bleaker and 
bleaker for the Irgun. The obvious step would seem to be to 
retaliate however, Menachem Begin had other ideas. 
Begin stated in his book that two factors saved the people 
from civil war: One was the fact that the Irgun taught its members 
not to hate their political ŬŮŸŬŪŤŪWVHĚ and the second factor being 
that the Irgun fought for the establishment of Jewish rule, not 
Irgun rule. 
Begin also noted the pragmatic logic of not attacking the 
Haganah. "A policy of retaliation would inevitably lead to 
gunbattles in the street ••• and could have had only one victor 
the British. Given time the Haganah would surely have won an 
extended underground war" (Bell, 134). Begin hoped that with luck 
The Season would end soon. Begin hoped that the events of The 
Season, would be distasteful to the Yishuv; making the Haganah seem 
to be collaborators in their own country. In the mean time, the 
Irgun would go deeper into hiding. The Season continued for months. 
The months of coercion did have some positive outcomes for the 
Irgun.The Season,strengthened the Irgun and created support were 
there had been none before. The Irgun attracted the sympathy and 
understanding of many who abhorred their politics and who doubted 
their sanity. Begin had crossed a very painful road for the Irgun 
but he had avoided what he felt would be the downfall of the Jewish 
people, a civil war. 
with the growing support of the Yishuv, there also came a 
growing body of young men who wished to aid in the revolt. Many 
people wished to join the Irgun for a variety of reasons, some of 
which were not acceptable to the Irgun. The process of induction 
into the Irgun was very difficult. A candidate had to make contact 
with a member and then was interviewed by a three member committee. 
The commi ttee asked the candidate a variety of questions but 
focused primarily on his ideological awareness. Who are the Jews? 
What is the revolt? What's in stake in Palestine? The committee 
eliminated anyone who hesitated when it came to questions that 
involved sacrifice, expulsion and even death. Once the selection 
was made, the individual went through four months of training where 
they learned the ways of the underground. They later recognized 
safe houses and later learned weapons training in the desert. In 
the early part of the struggle where there were limited weapons the 
individuals learned the art of explosives (Bell, 108). Many were 
disappointed that they were not armed but rather were assigned to 
posting up the Herut. Granted this was not a glorious assignment, 
yet this was a very important task that could result in 
imprisonment or a bullet in the back. The posting of literature was 
just as important as blowing up a building. 
At this point in time, tQe Irgun also did not have need for 
many men to blow up buildings at this point for two reasons. One, 
there simply were not enough weapons to arm the entirety of the 
Irgun. The Irgun was actively robbing establishments for capital 
and the some of its favorite targets have been British armories. 
The second reason is that the Irgun was what Begin called a small 
group of efficient "idealists." Due to the small size of the 
Mandate there were risks in having a large organization. Because of 
its small size, the Irgun could move very freely. There were also 
other benefits to a small organization: A small size decreased the 
risk of arrests and the loss of arms, men from a small organization 
could be replaced with an increase in efficiency, and in a large 
organization it would be difficult to maintain the high level of 
efficiency. The Irgun was a small body of loyalists (Bell, 112). 
They added to their efficiency, passion and often times that was 
all that was needed to accomplish a mission. 
The Irgun operated in a land that offered them very little 
protection as Begin stated, "We were completely visible to the 
enemy's eyes •.• we saw but were unseen. We naturally had a variety 
of names, we used a selection of identity documents ••• but we were 
never in bunkers, we carried no arms for our defence. We were 
teachers and students real or imaginary ••• merchants or 
bookkeepers •• indistinguishable from other citizens. The police came 
across our people time out of number •••• But what could they find 
on them, they carried no arms. They carried work tools or documents 
of the firm employing them. Who would suspect peaceful citizens 
going to work or coming home (Begin, 105-106)?" This policy of an 
"open underground" was as effective as any daring Irgun operation. 
The policy of not carrying weapons spared the lives of many 
Irgunists and saved the arms as well. It is with this policy of 
blending into the populace that the Irgun retained its people and 
did not need a large number of highly active members. This remained 
- true until the numbers of the Irgun swelled in 1948 out of 
necessity. 
with the failure of The Season, the British lost their best 
opportunity to stamp out the Irgun. Now that the war was over, the 
world began to look closer at the actions of imperialist 
Britain. The actions of the British remained to maintain law and 
order in the Mandate and wait" for instructions from London. None 
were to come until after the election. 
The Jewish Agency waited very anxiously for the election of 
1945. Churchill being victorious in the war felt that his party 
would be rewarded at he polls, he was quite wrong. In a shocking 
upset, the Labour party with Clement Attlee as prime minister and 
Ernest Bevin as foreign secretary won. The Zionists were very 
exited and optimism ran high. Now that the government of Churchill 
was out, the Jewish Agency felt the feelings of imperialism and the 
support of the Arabs were soon to follow. Most agreed with the 
statement of the Zionist paper Dayar that stated, "The victory of 
the Labour party ••• is a clear victory for the demand of the 
Zionists" (Pedazur, 34). Most felt that statehood was very close 
with the installation of the more liberal Attlee government. The 
Yishuv were so certain of good things to come that even the Irgun 
stopped operations for two weeks to permit the British an 
opportunity to produce a satisfactory initiative. 
The initiative did not come. The new government was facing 
many economic problems at home, they were facing a potential new 
enemy. The British could not afford to disrupt the British position 
-- with the Arab nations. This position was key to British economic 
-
interests. The alienation of the Arabs would hurt the already shaky 
British economy and that was more important than the Zionist 
demands. 
As a result of British prioratizing, pre-election promises of 
a new state went unanswered and the Zionists in London found 
themselves facing many closed doors. On August 25, 1945 the 
Colonial Office announced to the Zionists that immigrant quotas 
would not be lifted. This caused the embitterment of most of the 
Zionists and created the staga of a strange union. 
Bevin seemed immune to p.ersuasion and thus, many within the 
Haganah urged for a policy of pressure, as signal to Bevin. Herut 
stated that 25 men from the Palmach, the military arm of the 
Haganah, resigned to join the Irgun (Bell, 142). Action was needed 
and a truce, between the Haganah and the Irgun, was called. The 
Haganah felt that now was the time for action. A unified fighting 
force was suggested. Begin agreed to join the men that persecuted 
him only a short time earlier. He however doubted the stamina of 
the Haganah and suggested that rather than a meshing of all men and 
resources, there be a strategic command set up in which the Agency 
. 
had veto powers over all operations except operations for funds. 
The units were to be separate yet work together (Begin, 187). This 
plan was acceptable to the Haganah, the Irgun and the LEHI or the 
stern Group. Thus the Tenuat Hameri, the united Resistance Movement 
was created. 
The movement was plagued with poor coordination, yet the 
-addition of the Haganah manpower and firepower caused an 
acceleration of bombings. The British began to feel the massive 
bombings on railways, bridges·, government buildings, and police 
stations. The British Colonial secretary issued a warning that if 
this "wanton resort to force •.• is not stopped ••• further steps we 
had in mind in our endeavor to settle this difficult problem will 
be brought to nought (parliament Papers, 4)." Two weeks after this 
statement the violence continued and the British began sending more 
units to Palestine, Lt. General Alan CUnningham replaced the more 
moderate Field Marshal Viscount Gort as High Commissioner, Britain 
was poised to punish the Jews. British troop levels rose to 80,000, 
and there were thousands of other police units. The ratio of 
British security forces to Jewish population rose to one to five 
(Bell, 153). The Mandate took on the appearance of a fortress. The 
land was covered with barbed wire and blocks of check points. 
On the morning of June 29, 1946 the British were out to defeat 
Jewish terrorism. Tens of thousands of soldiers fanned across the 
countryside, imposed a curfew, and led thousands away. The building 
of the Jewish Agency was occupied. The results of these searches 
was devastating to the Palmach. Over half were jailed, many 
prominent members of the Haganah were detained and numerous arms 
were confiscated in the effort. The blow was tremendous. (Begin, 
205-207). After long discussi-ons the Haganah felt it could not 
afford to continue in the movement. After the public Haganah 
institution denouncing terrorism, the V.I.Ps within the Haganah 
were released. For the Haganah, the struggle was suspended. 
The offensive of the British against the Haganah did not only 
suspend the action of the Haganah, it also created another 
by-product, this was the most infamous terrorist attack of the 
entire revolt - the King David Hotel bombing. 
During the Mandate, the OŸŪŦĚDavid Hotel in Jerusalem was used 
to house the major military and civil institutions of the British. 
This was the heart of the British command and was a veri table 
fortress in Eretz Israel. 
During the Spring of 1946, the Irgun had began making plans 
for the attack on the structure but, the Haganah command said that 
the plan was too ambitious and that the time was not right for an 
attack that would excessively inflame the British. The Irgun 
opposed the Haganah position but adhered to the agreement of the 
United Resistance Movement. 
The plans for the attack were pending until the British 
offensive on June 29. After the offensive, the situation changed 
somewhat and the attack not only seemed correct, it also became 
necessary and the position of the Haganah changed completely. 
The Irgun commenced with the attack for what they felt were 
three very important reasons. One reason is the fact that the Irgun 
supported the notion of "the scope of the reprisal is equal to the 
magnitude of the attack" (Begin, 214). The British attacked and 
occupied the Offices of the Jewish Agency. The Jewish Agency was 
regarded as the Jewish headquarters so the equal British 
counterpart was the King David Hotel. The second reason was that 
,'-
the Yishuv began to doubt the ability of the resistance in fighting 
the British. The resistance recognized the danger of defeatism and 
felt that something was to be done to reassure the masses that the 
revolt could be won. The third and most important reason was the 
fact that the Haganah had become used to its semi-legal status and 
thus it didn't take steps to secure its documents thinking that it 
had a certain amount of immunity. As a result of this oversight, 
the British had acquired many secret Haganah documents from the 
building. Many of these documents were very incriminating to the 
resistance effort as well as to very senior Haganah individuals. An 
example of the severity was a speech which corroborated Jewish 
Agency responsibility for various sabotage operations carried out 
by the Haganah which was contrary to what Ben Gurion had said 
before the Anglo-American Commission only a few months ago (Begin, 
215). As could be expected, the Haganah leadership was very eager 
to destroy these very damaging documents and the Irgun attack on 
the hotel seemed like the perfect vehicle to accomplish this. 
The bombing was carefully planned out and it was decided to 
place the explosives in milk cans in the basement of the hotel. 
Next, the leadership argued about how much time to give as a 
warning. The time was crucial for the Irgun wanted enough time to 
allow the people in the hotel to escape, yet they didn't want to 
give the British enough time to remove the incriminating documents 
from the building. After much debate, the time decided upon was 
half an hour (Begin, 216). The operatives placed the explosives and 
fled. As soon as the operatives were safe, the Irgun called in the 
-warning to the hotel. In addition to calling in the warning to the 
hotel, the Irgun also called. the Palestine Post and they also 
warned the French Consulate, due to its close proximi ty to the 
hotel, to open its windows, to avoid damage from the blast. A half 
an hour had passed and a tremendous explosion rocked Jerusalem. The 
military wing of the hotel was in ruins. The explosion was 
extremely effective. However, for some reason, the building was not 
evacuated and as a result more than 200 people, both British and 
others, were killed or injured. The bombing shocked the world and 
the Irgun were labeled as murderers. 
The reaction was very severe. The British insisted that no 
warning had been given and that this act was a deliberate act of 
terror. The Haganah and the YiShuv didn't want to accept the blame. 
They stated the Irgun was guilty of "treason and murder." The Dayar 
stated that there was "no reason and no atonement.Hln Paris,David 
Ben-Gurion stated that "The Irgun are the enemy of the Jewish 
people." The Haganah wanted their involvement buried and the Irgun 
understood the hint. 
After the bombing the curfews began and continued for two 
weeks. The house to house searches began and Gen. Barker stated 
that "I am determined that they should be punished and made aware 
of our feelings of contempt and disgust at their behavior .•• I 
understand that these measures will create difficulties for the 
troops, but I am certain that if my reasonings are explained to 
them, they will understand their duty and will punish the Jews in 
the manner this race dislikes the most: by hitting them in the 
pocket, which will demonstrate our disgust for them (Kimche, 42)." 
The Irgun received a copy of Barker's order and within a week 
they had plastered this anti-semitic statement allover Eretz 
Israel. The combination of the indiscriminate searches and the 
anti-semitic statements of the British leadership caused the Yishuv 
to shift their anger from the Irgun to the British, who were making 
their lives unbearable. 
In the autumn of 1946, the Irgun began operations in Europe. 
The Irgun began training and planning in areas with heavy 
detainees, Jews who were denied visas to Eretz Israel. The heaviest 
concentrations of detainees was in southern France and in southern 
Italy. Due to an agreement with some sympathetic French officials, 
who were accommodating to the revolt, the Irgun agreed not to carry 
out operations on French soil. As a result, the other practical 
point of attack was southern Italy, primarily Rome. With the help 
from detainees from Poland, Xugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, the 
Irgun painted a swastika on the British consulate and later bombed 
the British embassy (Bell, 180). The Irgun later claimed 
responsibility and the British press had a field day. The press 
viewed the Irgun as a real threat to the British people in Britain. 
Headlines across the Island read, "Irgun Threatens London." The 
Bri tish felt that the Irgun had planned to assassinate various 
officials who had served in Palestine and they intended to blow up 
various government buildings (Bell, 181). In actuality, the Irgun 
had next to no operatives in Britain. However due to the bombing, 
the Palestine problem became more urgent and visible for the 
ŸĚ British people. Pressure grew on the government out of the fear 
-
that the Irgun was poised to attack London. This was a great gift 
for the revolt, because all this fear and pressure arose at no cost 
to the Irgun. 
Soon after the attack on the embassy, the Irgun carried out an 
operation in Eretz Israel in which two Irgun members were captured 
by the British for carrying weapons, and were sentenced to eighteen 
years in prison and eighteen lashes. Begin was outraged and said, 
"Was an oppressor now to whip us in our own country? Would the 
rebels of our generation, ready and willing to sacrifice their 
lives for the liberation of their people, tolerate this humiliation 
(Begin, 231)?" Begin wrote the Irgun response himself stating that 
the punishment of the British is against "soldiers' honour" and 
that "if put into effect - every[British] officer will be liable to 
be punished in the very same way: to get 18 whips. " This 
declaration was pasted allover Eretz Israel. This statement was 
consistent with the policies of reciprocating actions in kind of 
the Irgun. The British decided to call the bluff of the Irgun. Both 
men were indeed whipped. As they had promised, the Irgun captured 
two British officers and gave them eighteen thrashes each. The 
Irgun responses humiliated the British in the world's eyes, as a 
j 
result, the whip was never used again in the Mandate (Bell, 185). 
The winter of 1946-47 was a very trying period for the British 
economy. The Empire was teetering and six years of war and two of 
peace had taken their toll on the budget. It seemed that throughout 
the Empire, uprisings were brewing. During the winter, the worst 
-storms in memory raged through the country, imports were down and 
. 
factories began to shut down, due to lack of power. Unemployment 
was rampant and the nation had an agenda full of imminent and 
important decisions, in a cold and exhausted nation, the shaken 
Cabinet felt that now was the time to give up on the boggled mess 
that is Palestine. On February 14, the British announced that they 
were turning over the Mandate to the United Nations in September. 
Four days later in a speech to the Commons, Nevin said, "For the 
Jews, the essential point of principle is the creation of a 
sovereign Jewish State. For the Arabs the essential point of 
principle is to resist to the last the establishment of Jewish 
sovereignty in any part of ŮŸŨŤVWÙŪŤĚ.•• There is no prospect of 
,,' 
resolving this conflict by any settlement between the parties." The 
British could not afford to alienated the United states and the 
t, 
rest of the world on one hand, or the Arabs on the other. What's 
more is that the British no longer had the resources to impose a 
decision no matter what the decision may be. So as a result, 
i 
Britain had little option but to leave the burden up to the United 
Nations (Bell, 188). 
The Irgun did not believe that the British were going to 
., 
leave. They asked why would they still be recrui ting for the 
police? Why were military operations being expanded? The British 
Colonial Secretary stated to 'Commons that "we are not going to 
surrender the mandate to the United Nations." This was all the 
proof the Irgun needed. Begin Knew that the British would delay 
their departure as to strengthen the Arabs in arms and in tactics. 
r 
-The British stay in Eretz Israel had to terminated as soon as 
possible (Begin, 325). 
The situation in Palestine went from bad to worse. The British 
condemned four Irgun men that were captured after being injured 
during an operation. The men were to be hanged as terrorists. The 
sentencing of these men prompted the Irgun to state that if these 
four men are to be hanged, so too shall British soldiers meet the 
same fate. This was another ultimatum that received world attention 
and thus pressure as well. The British balked and issued a stay, to 
the uproar of the British administration in London. The world saw 
that the British gave in again to the terrorists. Feeling 
humiliated, General Barker issued his final order before leaving 
his position as High Commissioner in Palestine. That order was to 
hang the men immediately. The Irgun issued its response to the 
hangings, by stating, "In the future, every combatant unit of Irgun 
. 
will be accompanied by a war court of the Jewish Underground 
Movement. Every enemy subject will immediately be brought before 
the court. He will be tried for entering illegally into Palestine, 
for illegal possession of arms and their use against civilians, for 
murder, oppression and exploitation; there will be no appeal 
against the decision of the people's court. Those condemned will be 
hanged or shot (Gitlin, 98)." As a result of this the British 
confined troops to barracks and with good reason, for the Irgun 
were trying to locate some personnel to hold hostage. They did 
locate two men, however they managed to escape. The Irgun next 
kidnapped M.M. Collins, a VŠŨŤŸĚmanager. The Irgun drove him out to 
-a grove and prepared a noose. He begged for mercy and stated that 
he was a British Jew. They asked for proof and the only thing he 
could think of was that he was circumcised. This didn't satisfy the 
men. As they were fitting the noose around his neck, he began to 
sing children's prayers and the prayers of lament for the dead in 
Hebrew. This satisfied the men. They knew Begin's orders no to kill 
other Jews so, Collins was driven back to the city and released. 
The search went on (Bell, 202). 
The attention was diverted from the kidnappings for the moment 
as there was news of a weakness in the Acre Prison. The Acre prison 
was an old Crusader fortress that the British used to house the 
"political" prisoners. The Irgun had hundreds of men there and when 
the opportunity presented itself the Irgun jumped on it. On May 4, 
1947, the Irgun performed what the New York Herald Tribune referred 
to as a perfectly executed dangerous mission. The world was at awe 
at the bravery of the Irgun and the British were outraged. The 
jailbreak released 120 Jews some LEHI but most of them were Irgun 
(Begin, 299). The operation was successful, but not without cost. 
Five men were captured. 
Shortly after the Acre breakout, the united Nations felt that 
it did not have enough information on the situation in Palestine. 
i 
As a result, it created UNSCOP, United Nations special Committee on 
Palestine. The committee consisted of a collection of pro- Zionist 
as well as pro - Arabs supporter. It was headed by Emil Sandstrom 
of Sweden and it also included the director - general of the 
Trusteeship Council, Dr. Ralph Bunche. Few people believed that the 
-committee would accomplish anything. The Jews felt it was a British 
stalling tactic, and the Arabs had their doubts about the British 
and placed little faith in the international intervention process. 
Shortly before the arrival of UNSCOP, the Irgun returned to 
the task at hand and kidnapped two British policemen and a war 
clerk. The Irgun knew that the five prisoners from. the Acre 
breakout would soon be tried and condemned. The Irgun felt it must 
maintain the advantage and take the initiative. 
The UNSCOP arrived in Palestine just as the trial for the men 
was concluding. The five men were found guilty of several capital 
charges. Three were condemned and two were given fifteen years due 
to their youth. Upon hearing their sentences, the accused broke out 
in song. They and the people watching all began to sing Hatikvah, 
the mournful anthem of Zionism. The conditions in Palestine upset 
the UNSCOP observers. The land was full of roadblocks and 
barricades, patrols, and barbed wire. This was the way that the 
British maintained order and the observers were shocked. They were 
also those among the observers who felt that the men that were 
convicted were dedicated patriots rather than common felons as the 
British would like them to believe (Bell, 224). Begin felt that the 
Irgun position could only be explained effectively if there was a 
( 
face to face meeting with the UNSCOP Committee members and himself 
ĒŸĚ.. 
and some other leaders of the Irgun. Through the intersession of 
Carter Davidson, and Samuel Katz, Begin met with Sandstrom, Bunche 
and his aid. Both men had an open mind and ŴŤŲŸĚsympathetic to the 
Jewish cause. As the men were leaving the meeting site, Bunche 
-turned to Begin and said, "I can understand you. I am also a member 
of a persecuted minority (Katz, 160)." The Irgun was cautiously 
optimistic about the meetings. Wi th the Irgun, words carry no 
weight, it is action that gets things accomplished. 
The attention of the world again focused on the question if 
the men involved in the Acre prison break would indeed be hanged. 
The British knew they were in an awkward position. They knew the 
Irgun position of equal reprisal and thus they faced the grim 
choice of either giving in to blackmail or risking the lives of the 
two sergeants that the Irgun was holding hostage. The British 
decided they must let justice and the preservation of British rule 
triumph. They executed the five men on July 29. Upon hearing of the 
hangings, Begin was urged to respond quickly. He knew he must hang 
the two men, but the question was how. The British soon put up 
roadblocks and waited for. any possible Irgun move with 
anticipation. The Irgun high command stressed that failure to act 
would result in the dimming of Irgun prestige (Bell, 237). Begin 
then approved a daring plan to execute the men and then remove 
their bodies and then leave them in an orange grove. The plan was 
successful. 
Upon hearing of the deaths of the two soldiers, Britain was in 
an uproar. There were anti-semitic protests in the streets, 
headlines that urged for reprisals, and various acts of vandalism 
against Jewish property. The violence did not stop in Britain. It 
also occurred in Palestine. There were cases of shootings of buses 
and cars, some occurring while the men were still in British 
-uniforms (Bell, 238). The initial reaction of the news was anger 
but as that faded the feeling that the British should pullout 
began to gain support. The Manchester Guardian ran an article 
stating that it was "Time to Go". The news from the mandate was 
always bad. It was costing the treasury money that it could not 
afford, and the general feeling was that the men were dying for 
nothing. Britain felt it was time to hand the quagmire over to the 
united Nations. 
The UNSCOP also witnessed another act of violence. There have 
constantly been attempts by Jews to smuggle other Jews into Eretz 
Israel. Perhaps no single case had drawn so much attention as the 
-
case of the Exodus. The Exodus was an old ship purchased by the 
r 
Haganah for the use of bringing Jewish immigrants into Eretz 
., 
Israel. After some quick maneuvers and some quick loading 
the Exodus left France. The ship had a total of 4,554 refugees 
(Gruber, 18). The ship broke through the British blockade and was 
twenty miles off the coast of Palestine, well in international 
waters, when a British destroyer came alongside the vessel and 
attempted to board her. Another destroyer arrived and it began to 
ram the stern of the Exodus. The rammings continued as well as the 
lobbing of tear gas into the vessel. After the" gas, then came the 
boarding. The British sailors boarded the ship while the Jews 
fought with whatever they could find (Bell, 231). The result was 
J 
one dead, five seriously wounded, and 120 injured (Gruber, 18). 
There was outrage in Eretz Israel upon hearing the news, general 
strikes occurred in several cities and many marches took place, but 
nothing could prevent the transfer of the illegal immigrants from 
the Exodus onto three British vessel for the journey to the 
detention camps in Cypress. These refugees would join the 10,000 
Jews already detained there. The scene of the British herding these 
Jews through the gangways onto the other ships was not an 
attractive mission for the British. The action drew much world 
attention and the exercise was witnessed personally by Justice 
Sandstrom who was watching form behind the rolls of barbed wire. He 
was learning quite a lesson (Bell, 232). 
The general economic situation in Britain was worsening. Atlee 
was declaring a new "Battle Of. Britain" a battle on the worsening 
economy. In this new plan, the large contingency of forces in 
Palestine would have to be reduced. ThUS, it was very interesting 
when the UNSCOP recommendation came out on the deadline of August 
31, 1947. 
The UNSCOP agreed in essence to partition the land into two 
states with economic union. There were differences among the 
delegates concerning the size and the conditions of the 
territories. Bell states, that "the majority proposed a Jewish 
territory to include eastern Galilee, the central coastal plain, 
and the Negev Desert. The Arabs would have western Galilee, central 
Palestine,and the coastal plain. The Jerusalem - Bethlehem area 
would be an international zone. There would be two year 
probationary period, and Jewish immigration would continue at a 
monthly rate of 6,250 in the first two years and 5,000 after that." 
The Irgun and the Arabs were both not happy with the 
recommendation, The Irgun and the Arabs each want all of Palestine 
and opposed a partition. 
On September 23, the Colonial Secretary stated to the General 
Assembly that Britain would not agree to a partition (Bell, 243). 
This meant only one thing to Begin, that the British would continue 
to seal off the Mandate so that their Arab allies could invade 
Eretz Israel and improve their military position (Begin, 333). The 
Irgun felt that the naive Jewish Agency would once again sellout 
Eretz Israel for empty promises. As the vote on Palestine neared, 
less attention was paid to the Irgun. Many felt that their extreme 
actions and their immovable position of no land concessions would 
hamper the diplomatic solution to the problem. Many people felt 
that the Irgun was out of the mainstream and thus did not represent 
the Jewish people. 
t I 
During the TŸŞŠWŤVĚover the Palestine ÙVVẀŤŸĚBritain seemed to 
oppose partition. "They offered no alternatives, and would 
implement nothing unacceptable to both Arabs and Jews; in effect, 
they would implement nothing •••• Those who suspected that Britain 
had shifted all but openly to the Arab side had ample evidence ••• 
Those who suspected that Britain intended to stay no matter what 
happened had ample evidence too. (Bell, 247)" 
As the various subcommittees tried to create a solution that 
would be agreeable to two-thirds of the General Assembly, the size 
of the Jewish state was reduced by 500 square miles, with the 
removal of Jaffa and the ÔŤŦŸẂHĚ and it was understood that the 
British would decide when the mandate was to end. On November 29 
-1947, the partition subcommittee resolution was put up to a vote 
before the General Assembly. By a vote of 33 yes, 13 no, and 10 
abstentions, a new Jewish state was created (Bell, 249). Upon 
hearing the news, there was much jubilation amongst the Jews. Their 
dream had become a reality. Amongst the festivities, there were 
some unhappy groups most importantly were the Arabs and the Irgun. 
Jamal Husseini who ŲŤŮŲŤVŸŪWŤTĚthe Palestinian Arabs summed up 
Arab feelings when he warned that partition would mean war. The 
Arabs would not stand for this injustice (Bell, 250). Amir Arslan 
of Syria stated "Let the consequences be on the heads of others, 
not on ours" (Official Record of the Second Session of the General 
Assembly, 1425). The Arabs were preparing for war. 
The Irgun was very much against the partition. In a statement 
the Irgun stated, .. The Partition of the Homeland is illegal. The 
signature by institutions and individuals of the partition 
agreement is invalid. It will not bind the Jewish people. Jerusalem 
was and will for ever be our capital. Eretz Israel will be restored 
to the people of Israel. All 'of it. And for ever" (Begin, 335). 
'" " Begin also stressed that the partition gives the Arabs time and 
land to improve their position and that this is no time for 
rejoicing, it is time to prepare for war, a war for the very lives 
of the people of Israel. 
This was a correct prediction by the Irgun for shortly after 
the vote, Arabs began to fire of Jewish buses, the killing had 
begun. The Mandate fell into disorder. As the violence escalated 
and more and more Jews began to die, "the British simply stood by 
and observed, having no intention of risking further lives to 
monitor Arabs or defend Jews ••. The Jewish/Arab edges of the major 
cities became battlegrounds. The roads were unsafe. The isolated 
kibbutzim came under siege" (Bell, 255). 
During the violence, London finally gave High Commissioner 
cunningham a firm policy in the area. He was to keep out of the 
conflict. He was to "have nothing to do with the Partition in any 
way, shape, or form Just go out and govern the country" 
(Collins and Lapierre, 84). 
This supposed neutrality was anything but that, the British 
. 
were directing the Arab legions that were attacking the Jews, The 
British still turned away immigrants, the settlements being 
attacked were still prohibited by British law from possessing arms, 
and the British were still building bases well into December (Bell, 
256). This stance not only favored the Arabs, it also could in 
theory allow the British to stay in Palestine indefinitely. 
The Irgun not only maintained its attacks on the British, it 
also extended the revolt against the attacking Arabs. This meant 
that the Irgun would have to transform from a strictly underground 
force to a conventional army. This was a very difficult task for 
.ll 
there was a gross lack of arms: In the fight against the British a 
vast armory was not crucial, but against the regular and irregular 
armies of the Arabs, weapons would be precious.· As a result, the 
Irgun increased efforts to acquire arms. One method employed was to 
increase their own production methods and the·· other was a daring 
; 
one in which the Irgun came out into the open and asked the public 
-to contribute to the Irgun's "Iron Fund" (Begin, 340). This was a 
dangerous step indeed but the situation was grim. The proposed date 
of May 15 ,the date in which the British would pullout of 
. 
Pa1estine,was approaching quickly and if the Jews were not prepared 
to assume the frontier posts, they would be destroyed. The response 
was great, much to the surprise of the Jewish Agency. 
The High Command was optimistic about the abilities of the 
Irgun fighters. However, they felt that with only seven hundred 
armed troops, they could only maintain two areas of combat: Jaffa 
and the Rame1e-Lydda Arab sector of Jerusalem that strangled the 
ancient city from the north. The Irgun knew they could only sustain 
small raids but they must act. The primary focus of the Irgun was 
to "enlarge, train, and equip a more orthodox army as fast as 
possible" (Bell, 257). 
The Irgun who felt that action was needed and that Ben Gurion 
:c: 
was too reliant on the generosity of the U.N. began to increase its 
offensive operations. With the actions came Arab reprisals, and 
with these came the Irgun call to unite all fighters and to create 
a provisional government. Some within the Jewish Agency agreed with 
this yet, very few in the Agency leadership wished to a1 ign 
themselves with the dissidents. Ben Gurion did not trust the Irgun 
and did not support any such an enterprise (Bell, 263). In fact, 
the Irgun Haganah relationship began to strain and soon 
kidnappings and reprisals began to occur once'again. One of the 
most serious incidents occurred when during one of the Irgun' s 
., ŸĚ
drive for funds, Haganah men threw grenades into a Pro-Irgun crowd 
-this began to cause much anti - Haganah sentiment among the Yishuv. 
This and the promise from Begin to dissolve the Irgun led to an 
operational agreement on March 8. The Irgun would be under Haganah 
orders through Irgun officers. The Irgun would still oppose British 
attempts to disarm them and they were still permitted to raise 
funds that aren't Agency sources (Begin, 344). Fortunately for the 
Jews, the Arabs were having even more difficulties in creating a 
single unified policy towards the Jews. This lack of cohesion 
helped buy time for the Jews. 
During the winter months, there was quite a bit of sporadic 
violence. There were bombings and counter-bombings. The roads were 
almost impassible due to snipers. Trusted employees killed their 
employers, friends turned on friends. Angry mobs of both Arabs and 
Jews attacked members of the other ethnic group. Scores of people 
died in the area weekly. The Irgun retaliated in a quick and 
ruthless manner. Yet all their reprisals had no effect on the rate 
of Arab violence against Jews. The region was in a state of chaos 
and the British were staying as distant as possible. 
With the Arabs having the ability to furnish their troops with 
arms, the prime aim of attaining weapons was of the utmost 
importance for the Irgun, they supplemented their policy of 
attempting to gain funds to purchase weapons with the policy of 
increased operations of which the main objective was the theft of 
British weapons. The increased cache of Irgun weapons allowed them 
to feel they could carry out a major attack - an attack that would 
occur at Deir Yassin. 
--
Deir Yassin was a village which was a haven for Arab snipers, 
it was initially a prime target for the Haganah, but after some 
very bloody battles at Kastel and Hulda, the new Haganah commander, 
David Shaltiel, was very low on men and supplies and thus was 
begging for aid from the Irgun and LEHI. He contacted the Irgun 
commander, Mordechai Raanan and the LEHI commander Yehoshua Zettler 
and soon was involved in a shouting match with both of them, for 
the two commanders viewed Shaltiel as a Ben Gurion's hypocrite and 
a man who only a few years earlier betrayed the patriots by leading 
The Season against the Irgun (Bell, 291). The two commanders 
decided to organize an attack by themselves. Upon hearing this 
news, Shaltiel wrote both of them a letter stating that, " I wish 
to point out that the capture of Deir Yassin and its holdings are 
one stage in our[Haganah's] general plan. I have no objection to 
your carrying out the operation provided that you can hold the 
village. If you are unable to do so I warn you against blowing up 
the village ••• which would lead to the occupation of foreign 
forces. This situation would increase oUr[Haganah] difficulties in 
. , . 
the struggle and the second conquest of the place would require 
heavy sacrifices" (Kurzman, 293). The Irgun and LEHI commanders 
. 
ignored this warning due to their busy preparations. 
[ 
The battle began on April 9, this tiny village soon come to 
ŸÙĚ
symbolize Zionist cruelty. As the attack began, -LEHI men began to 
broadcast the warning that "You are being attacked by superior 
forces ••• The west exit of Deir Yassin leading to Ein Karim is open 
to you! Run immediately" (Kurzman, 142)! Shortly after it began to 
--
move, the vehicle that was broadcasting this message became 
disabled by Arab fire, as a result, very few Arabs heard the 
warning. The Jews met stiff resistance and sniping. The combat soon 
turned to house to house and often times it took indiscriminate 
fire and bombings to stop the sniping. As a result, many Arabs 
including women and children died. The battle was a victory for the 
Irqun and LEHI, but it soon became a public relations nightmare. 
Upon arriving at the edge of town, Shaltiel was asked by Raanan to 
take over the village. Shal tiel's response was," We're not going to 
take responsibility for your murders" (Kurzman, 147)! Shaltiel and 
his Haganah forces left the town and soon the stories of Irqun 
atrocities began. The Irqun denied all these charges and claimed 
',f 
that the attack was straightforward (Bell, 296). 
ĒGŸŸHĜĚ
On April 10, Shaltiel and the Haganah tried to put as much 
"-0' 
distance as possible between themselves and the dissidents. Ben 
:;:-., 
Gurion sent a letter of apology to the Arab leadership fearing that 
i"lS; 
the incident at Deir Yassin would end all chances of a negotiated 
. ,,1 
settlement. A settlement that both the Irqunand the LEHI felt 
would never come about and if it did would only end in the eventual 
death of the Jewish state. 
" 
After the loss at Deir Yassin and the death of the Arab 
IIMil i tary Messiah" Abdul Kader, the Arab masses began to lose hope. 
1t.,,:J.. ... 
Many of the prominent Arabs began to leave Jewisn controlled areas. 
Soon the rest of the masses began to flee 
I . 
due'to the tide of the 
HŸĚ.: ... ŸĴĚ
war and because of the news from Deir Yassin - they were scared of 
:;1' 
the Jews. As Begin noted in his book, some good did come out of the 
. :€ 
-"-
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